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Abstract: Through a framework drawn from Karl Polanyi’s substantivist theorization of 
economic practices, this paper evaluates the quest for equitable urbanization in Chongqing, 
a major city-region in southwestern China. Illuminating the tensions arising from two 
interrelated reforms, namely the ambitious attempt to construct 40 million m2 of public rental 
housing between 2010 to 2012 and the large-scale drive to ensure peasant migrants enjoy 
equal access to social benefits as current urban residents, the paper explains how the quest 
for equitable urbanization magnifies two nationwide dimensions of institutionalized uneven 
development, namely 1) the caste-like categorization of populations according to ‘urban’ 
and ‘rural’; and 2) the coastal bias in national economic development. The paper concludes 
that this state-driven quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing expresses the 
dialecticism of economic development in China: it is a social ‘counter movement’ against the 
effects of an uneven spatiality that was instituted to drive and deepen the marketization of 
Chinese society. 
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One test for whether reform is genuine is if people will emerge screaming about the pain they 
feel as a result. If no one feels any pain, that is not reform. – Hu Shuli, Editor-in-Chief of 
Caixin Media, interview with Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 2013) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Beginning from 2007, the Chinese state apparatus launched a series of path-
changing socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing, a city-region 1  in southwestern China. 
Widely taken by policymaking, academic and media circles as representative of a unique 
‘Chongqing model’ or ‘Chongqing experience’ of development, these reforms arguably 
placed Chongqing amongst what Shin (2012) terms the “unequal cities of spectacle and 
mega-events in China”. An emergent trend across China, mega-events like the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics or the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games were putatively intended to produce a 
national “unified space” that could at once enable “capital accumulation and socio-political 
stability for further accumulation” (Shin, 2012: 729). Unlike these one-off events, however, 
Chongqing did not become a national “unified space” through displacing or deferring 
preexisting social problems – the overarching objective was to resolve them. Hitherto un-
tested on a large scale, these reforms arguably became a “spectacle” in China because 
they wrestled proactively with national-level institutional constraints.  
In spite of what appears to be a “win-win” developmental approach, particularly 
against a backdrop of prodigious nationwide inequality2, the quest for greater social equity in 
Chongqing did not receive universal acclaim in China. Labeled neo-Maoist for launching 
‘red song’ singing campaigns (changhong) and portrayed as disregarding the rule of law in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Whilst officially designated a city, the term ‘city-region’ is used to describe Chongqing for two 
reasons. One, it occupies a huge land mass of 82,400km2, more than double the size of Taiwan; 
second, a significant portion of this land mass is still farmland and, until July 2012, less than half of 
the official 29 million population are registered as ‘urban’ residents.  
2 A study conducted by the Chinese Household Finance Survey Center (CHFSC) of Chengdu’s 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics presented China’s Gini coefficient for 2010 at 
0.61. Measured in relation to World Bank figures, this figure was substantially above the average of 
0.44 for all countries (Caixin Online, 2012). Earlier, Wang’s (2010) research illustrated how trillions of 
yuan were missing from official statistics; two-thirds of these missing funds belonged to 10% of the 
population. Presuming Wang’s study is accurate and that the CHFSC relied on official statistics, the 
Gini coefficient for China could measure higher than the reported 0.61.  
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its ‘anti-Mafia’ crackdowns (dahei), the Chongqing government came under further scrutiny 
for implementing the socioeconomic reforms. Perhaps the most contentious characteristic of 
these reforms is the large-scale investments required to embed capital accumulation 
processes in tandem with the enhancement of socio-spatial welfare.  On one hand, the 
Chongqing government successfully pushed for the demarcation of a “nationally strategic” 
economic development zone known as the Liangjiang New Area; on the other hand, it 
implemented a host of policies in the Chongqing urban area aimed at easing uneven spatial 
development associated with 1) the institutionalized organization of social life according to 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’, a Mao-era legacy; and 2) the coastal bias in the bid to build a ‘socialist 
market economy’, a definitive feature of Deng Xiaoping’s first-wave ‘liberalization’ reforms in 
1978. Displacing or deferring social problems to other time-spaces, for these critics, was 
seemingly preferred to confronting them together with the pursuit of economic goals. 
Taking this intense scrutiny as the analytical point of departure, this paper aims to 
add conceptual clarity to the post-2007 socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing. Rather than 
construe the events occurring within Chongqing as an endogenous expression of Maoist 
resurgence, the paper explores how local and extra-local factors interact to produce the 
reforms in Chongqing. As will be shown, the broad directions for the reforms were launched 
by the Chinese central government in March 2007. The municipality was chosen as a base 
for reforms for locational and administrative reasons: it was part of the vast interior 
hinterland that, over the last three decades, had been unable to keep up with the pace of 
economic growth in the coastal regions. Yet it was and remains the only municipality in 
interior China governed directly by the central government. This unique spatio-temporal 
positioning allowed the central government, then led by Hu Jintao, to directly address two 
aspects of uneven development that were prevalent at the national scale, namely the urban-
rural “dual structure” and the coastal-interior economic disparity. The ‘Chongqing 
experience’ is thus more accurately an expression of and a potential solution to the 
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underlying socioeconomic tensions associated with the CPC’s seemingly contradictory 
approach to ‘liberalize’ the Chinese economy on the back of institutionalized uneven spatial 
development. As Yao Zhongqiu (hereafter Qiu Feng, to use his official pen name), a 
prominent China-based public intellectual, puts it: 
The ‘Chongqing model’ contains all the problems that exist in the ‘China model’ of 
development, the only difference is that some of these problems were magnified in 
Chongqing. Hence when we reflect on the ‘Chongqing model’, we need to be aware of this 
point, we need to view it against a broader expanse. (Part of academic discussion at the 
Unirule Institute of Economics, Beijing, 6 December 2012; transcript published in China 
Review, 15 January 2013: n.p.; author’s translation) 
 
To grasp the connections between the reforms in Chongqing and the “broader 
expanse”, this paper develops an analysis that draws on and develops Karl Polanyi’s (1944, 
1957) substantivist conceptualization of economic practices. For Polanyi, the contemporary 
economy is “instituted” by three ‘modes of integration’3, namely redistribution, reciprocity 
and market exchange. All three modes would be present at any one time, although one 
mode might be more dominant than the others. Through this analytical framing, this paper 
argues that socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing illustrates the importance of state-driven 
redistribution in easing preexisting and potential social tensions engendered, paradoxically, 
by the effects of an uneven spatiality instituted for economic development by the same state 
apparatus. It conceptualizes the redistributive quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing 
as a protective act against the effects of instituted uneven development. Viewed against the 
CPC’s concomitant policies to deepen market-like governance in Chinese society, this quest 
corresponds to what Polanyi (2001[1944]: 136) terms “the double movement” in emergent 
market societies, namely that social counter movements would inevitably check the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In The Great Transformation, Polanyi (2001[1944]: 55) elaborated on the importance of another 
mode of integration in pre-capitalist societies known as householding. Defined as “production for 
one’s own use”, householding has seemingly taken a backseat in capitalist(ic) societies. As such, this 
mode received less focus in Polanyi’s 1957 work “The economy as an instituted process’. While the 
Chinese government defines the Chinese political economy as technically ‘socialist’ and 
householding in fact is an instituted economic feature under the Household Responsibility System 
(jiating lianchan zerenzhi), the intention of householding since Mao-era China has never been about 
subsistence: it was and remains a function of what is broadly known as ‘state capitalism’. For this 
reason, this paper will only examine the roles of redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange as 
the modes of economic integration in Chongqing and, by extension, China. 
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continuous expansion of markets.  
The subsequent four parts of the paper will demonstrate how this counter movement 
is expressed in and through Chongqing. Section 2 discusses how Polanyi’s substantivist 
approach to economic analysis is developed to examine the socioeconomic reforms in 
Chongqing. The geo-historical context of Chongqing’s politico-economic evolution is then 
presented in section 3. Section 4 begins by explaining the socioeconomic rationale of one 
main reform, the construction of large-scale public rental housing (gongzufang), in relation 
to another policy to facilitate ‘household registration’ conversion for rural residents (nongmin 
hukou zhuanyi). To achieve this objective, the section juxtaposes two sets of empirical 
materials4, namely, 1) narratives – both affirmative and antagonistic – on the redistributive 
policies to provide large-scale public rental housing and deepen reforms of the hukou 
(household registration) institution; and 2) quantitative data presented by the different 
actors. Drawing from the empirical analysis, the paper concludes by (re)focusing on the 
state’s role as a driver of a social counter movement through strategic redistribution. The 
bigger question crystallized through the Chongqing case is the extent to which future 
‘double movements’ within the Chinese political economy would continue to be determined 
by institutionalized uneven spatial development – a tool of socioeconomic control that, while 
serving the CPC so well since it launched the ‘socialist high tide’ in 1958, appears to be 
under immense strain in the current conjuncture. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4The empirical materials presented in this paper consist largely of narratives drawn from policy 
documents, news articles and academic essays published in Mandarin. These narratives, which 
reflect the views of major causal actors who were not accessible for interviews, are significant for the 
analysis employed in this paper. Complementary materials are drawn from the author’s personal 
observations through participation in academic seminars; discussions and interviews with local 
government officials and scholars; and visits to field sites in Chongqing. The overarching objective of 
the empirical analysis is not to ‘speak for’ the socioeconomic configuration of a field site ‘from a 
distance’; it is to bring existing theory – namely, the Polanyian framework – into contact with the 
discourses and statistics emerging from the field site. There is no a priori privileging of primary or 
secondary data; data that potentially contributes to theoretical re-construction was identified and 
evaluated. 
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2. The (re)institutionalization of socioeconomic embeddedness in China: a 
substantivist conceptualization  
 
Economic substantivism is an analytical approach postulated by Polanyi (1944, 
1957, 1977) to contrast the formalism that characterizes neoclassical economics. The 
primary characteristic of substantivism is that the ‘economy’ cannot be abstracted and 
theorized as an entity that is self-regulated by ecumenical laws of evolution. By extension, 
an economy can never be distinct from its constitutive socio-spatial formation. “While 
substantivist explanations are crafted in context rich and institutionally saturated settings”, 
Peck (2013: 1555) explains in an incisive exploration of Polanyian analytical approaches, 
“formalism implies a preference for parsimonious reasoning, prefabricated models, and 
singular logics, like the rational-choice paradigm.” Indeed, conditions of scarcity – the 
analytical basis of the rational-choice paradigm – do not solely determine economic choice 
(Polanyi, 1957); economic processes, as Polanyi (2001[1944]: 48) observes of pre- and 
non-capitalist economies, were intrinsically predicated on social goals: 
The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man’s 
economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to 
safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to 
safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods 
only in so far as they serve this end. 
 
The emphasis on “social relationships” as determinant of economic practices is 
crucial not only for the understanding of individual behavior; economic institutions also need 
to ensure their practices do not undermine social stability. In the contemporary conjuncture, 
these institutions are invariably established inside and/or alongside individual state 
apparatuses. Insofar as these state apparatuses claim to be representative of ‘the people’ 
(who arguably constitute the state’s primary ‘social assets’), their respective economic 
strategies would be entwined with the need to safeguard their social legitimacy amongst the 
people they govern. This entwinement is especially pronounced in China because the ruling 
Communist Party of China (CPC) functions in/as a one-party state apparatus whose social 
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relevance must be regularly demonstrated in practice to preclude potentially violent 
revolutions5.  
To comprehend the dynamics of Chinese politico-economic evolution, the CPC 
should be conceptualized as an embedded social actor in the first instance; as a mediator 
and driver of economic policies to achieve its self-determined social goal, i.e. a ‘Harmonious 
Society’ (hexie shehui) defined by the egalitarianism end-state known as ‘Common 
Affluence’ (gongtong fuyu). Indeed, it is this longstanding ideological commitment that 
positions Chinese socioeconomic evolution against Polanyi’s (2001[1944]: 60) definition of a 
‘disembedded economy’, that “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system”. Strong market regulation, 
characterized by the disembedding circulation of three ‘fictitious commodities’ (land, labor 
power and money), effectively means social actors would be subservient to the prerogatives 
of private capitalist producers. Because the CPC remains committed to create a 
communistic end-state6, it is obliged to preclude “fictitious commodities” from fully dictating 
the organization of social life. As will be addressed shortly, the socioeconomic reforms in 
Chongqing exemplify this obligation. 
Polanyi’s (1957; 1977) conceptualization of the economy as an “instituted process” 
forms the core of this paper’s analytical framework. He identifies three major ‘forms of 
integration’ that ‘institute’ the modern (capitalist) economy, namely redistribution, reciprocity 
and market exchange. Of these three forms, redistribution and reciprocity are “two principles 
of behavior not primarily associated with economics” (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 49). As this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The CPC leadership, still committed to what Deng Xiaoping called the ‘universal truth of Marxism’, 
understands very well the revolutionary potential of violence: it was precisely through violence – the 
CPC fought a protracted civil war between 1946-1949 – that the CPC became the ruling government 
of China. The Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s and the Tiananmen protests in 1989 were two 
other major instances where revolutionary fervor were accompanied with violence. 
6 In the summer of 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to the country “our red nation will 
never change color” (New York Times, 16 August 2013). Having demonstrated a clear disdain for 
‘empty talk’ (kongtan), Xi’s assertion can be taken as an a priori (re)statement of intent. It is against 
this concrete intention – namely, to enable an evolution towards a communistic endstate – that 
subsequent empirical phenomena should be dialectically evaluated. 
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paper will show, it is precisely because of this non-association that they are important for a 
market economy: 
 
Redistribution: This integrative process presupposes the centralization of goods and 
money by a powerful social institution, or what Polanyi (2001[1944]: 51) calls the 
“institutional pattern of centricity”: it “provides a track for the collection, storage, and 
redistribution of goods and services…[I]n all economies of kind a similar need exists, 
be the group ever so numerous. And the larger the territory and the more varied the 
produce, the more will redistribution result in an effective division of labor, since it 
must help to link up geographically differentiated groups of producers”. As Polanyi 
(1977: 37) elaborates, “In the case of redistribution...the movement cannot proceed 
without an established center from which redistribution takes place. Redistribution is 
not an individual pattern at all; and even when started on a small scale, it would 
depend upon the prior existence of a recognized center.”  
 
In the Chinese context, the central state apparatus had, since its establishment in 
1949, sought to regularly reproduce its position as the ‘recognized centre’ in the 
nationwide allocation of means and output of production. The underlying justification 
for this redistributive commitment is to preclude social tensions and set the Chinese 
political economy on the path towards an unknown end-state known as ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’ (cf. Lim, 2014). Yet, the very ability of the central state 
apparatus to hold itself as the “recognized centre” and produce an “effective division 
of labor”, in Polanyi’s parlance, is predicated on reciprocity between socioeconomic 
actors located in different geographical regions. 
 
Reciprocity: An act of transfer which is not price-determined, but from which an act 
of transfer with an approximately symbolic value is expected in return (either in 
future or immediately). These transfers reveal specifically the relationships between 
actors (e.g. kinship networks); they generate trust and are fundamental to the 
creation of social harmony. In the non-capitalist societies of Western Melanesia, 
Polanyi (2001[1944]: 51) observes, reciprocity was characterized by the “institutional 
pattern of symmetry”: an arrangement of “duality” facilitated the exchange of goods, 
disguised as gift-giving, between the coastal and inland villages. Yet Polanyi 
(2001[1944]: 51) was quick to add that the origins of “institutional symmetry” were 
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unclear, and that it would be “impracticable” for this process to exist on its own in the 
long run. Rather, “symmetry and centricity will meet halfway the needs of reciprocity 
and redistribution; institutional patterns and principles of behavior are mutually 
adjusted” (Ibid.; ref. discussion on redistribution above).  
 
Within contemporary China, institutional symmetry can be observed in two domains. 
First, reciprocity is (to be) derived through the quest for spatial balance between the 
coastal provinces and the vast interior hinterland. In a 1988 speech, then Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping issued an injunction to every Chinese citizen residing in the 
coastal provinces to reciprocate the state’s decision to first implement reforms in 
their provinces by accepting the subsequent redistribution of accumulated value 
accruing from economic liberalization for the development of the interior: “upon 
attaining a certain level of development, the coastal areas are requested to give 
more energy to assist in the development of the interior, this is also a ‘big picture’…It 
is an obligation for economically-advanced areas to help those that are more 
backward, and it is also a major policy” (Deng, 1993: 278; author’s translation). Yet, 
as the Chongqing case shows, the attainment of inter-regional reciprocity is – or, 
specifically, has to be – simultaneously premised on institutional centricity. Second, 
the Chinese state apparatus established reciprocal relations with the private 
capitalist class – including those located abroad – with the understanding that its 
one-party rule is beyond question. Domestically, these relations were 
institutionalized by the Jiang Zemin government after Jiang personally called on 
private capitalists – denigrated as ‘class enemies’ during the Mao-era – to be given 
the right to join the CPC. The intriguing “co-option” of domestic private capitalists into 
the CPC, as Dickson (2008) explains in elaborate detail, arguably produced a 
“duality” in which state-linked and private economic actors could co-exist insofar as 
the CPC’s institutional centricity – or, indeed, its institutionalized existential 
immortality7 – remains unchallenged. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The party’s existential timelessness is enshrined in what Deng Xiaoping calls the ‘Four Cardinal 
Principles’. These four principles are: 1) We must keep to the socialist road; 2) We must uphold the 
dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; 4) We must 
uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is important to note that the third principle is 
the pivot on which the other three principles rest. The full text of Deng’s speech on the Four Cardinal 
Principles is published in People’s Daily (30 March 1979), accessible here: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html  
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Market exchange: The competitive buying and selling of commodities whose values 
are determined by forces of supply and demand and expressed through monetary 
prices. The ‘market’, as an institutional system, is constituted by redistribution and 
reciprocity: “the validating and organizing factor [of market exchange] springs not 
from the individual but from the collective actions of persons in structured situations. 
Exchange as a form of integration is dependent on the existence of a market system, 
an institutional pattern which, contrary to common assumptions, does not originate in 
random actions of exchange” (Polanyi 1977: 37). This market system, Polanyi (1944) 
avers, ‘fictionalizes’ three entities – labor (power), land and money – as 
commodities. These ‘commodities’ are “fictitious” because they cannot innately be 
produced for sale; their saleable ‘nature’ is a material construction constituted by and 
contingent on processes of redistribution and reciprocity. Redistribution is not the 
only necessary process for market-building, however; if the participants choose to 
disrespect rules and disrupt the terms of exchange (i.e. lack of reciprocity), 
exchange relations could break down. As such, the ‘free’ market is a deontological 
entity; changing and often contested redistributive and reciprocal processes 
determine the degree of ‘freedom’ in and the geographic extent of any market (cf. 
section 4).  
 
These three forms of socioeconomic integration are taken as occuring 
simultaneously and symbiotically rather than chronologically. In a subsequent development 
of The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1957: 256) makes clear that the “forms of integration 
do not represent ‘stages’ of development. No sequence in time is implied. Several 
subordinate forms may be present alongside of the dominant one, which may itself recur 
after a temporary eclipse”. This clarification is important in methodological and analytical 
terms, as Peck (2013: 1556-1557) explains: “particular modes of integration should not be 
expected to secure monopoly positions within actually existing economies, which are 
heterogeneous and hybrid; economic logics and rationalities are plural, warranting parity of 
analytical esteem across modes of integration.” In relation to a diverse economy like China, 
Peck and Zhang (2013: 388) believe this presupposition of plural economic logics and 
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rationalities occuring in tension with one another is more helpful for theoretical 
(re)construction:  
What if, instead of positioning the principle of market coordination in a sequential and 
historical relationship with social regulation and institutional embeddedness, in a temporal 
reading of the double-movement metaphor (as if marketization and socialization only see-
saw against one another through time), this was replaced with a simultaneous and 
geographical conception of the contradictory coexistence of the integrative principles of 
market exchange, reciprocity and redistribution within fundamentally heterogeneous 
economies? This conception, in which variegated capitalisms necessarily (co)exist with their 
others, in contradictory and often crisis-prone hybrids and in webs of mutually constitutive 
relations, might enable a critical but theoretically ‘positive’ understanding of China’s 
development path. (Peck and Zhang, 2013: 388; emphases-in-original) 
 
Through the Chongqing case, this paper examines how Polanyi’s three integrative 
mechanisms intersect within a “fundamentally heterogeneous” Chinese socio-economy. On 
one hand, this place-specific intersection appears different from the national-scale 
combination of these mechanisms; on the other, it is expressive of national-scale structural 
contradictions. Taken together, these phenomena highlight antagonisms associated with the 
Chinese central government’s attempt to expand economic liberalization and its seemingly 
contradictory commitment to ease a crucial precondition of the liberalization process – 
uneven spatial development (cf. Lim, 2014). That the post-2007 redistributive strategies 
took center-stage as a social ‘counter movement’ in Chongqing, this paper argues, in itself 
indicates the inability of reciprocal economic relations to exclusively enhance social equity 
at the national scale. More crucially, insofar as the CPC continues to expand its 
marketization drive, the Chongqing reforms represent the socially-protective part of what 
Polanyi (2001[1944]: 138) terms a “double movement”: 
The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-
regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-
faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at 
the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying 
support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – 
primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and using protective 
legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods. 
 
Parallel to Polanyi’s (2001[1944]) observation of earlier societies, the socioeconomic 
reforms in Chongqing demonstrate the entwinement of redistribution and reciprocity as 
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modes of economic integration. The growing dominance of market exchange in China 
presupposes the existence and exchange of personal assets protected legally by a strong 
“established centre”. Yet the same “established centre” is required to hold market actors in 
check; it is required to ensure the social inequality ensuing from marketization (which is now 
acute in income and geographic terms) does not undermine the stability of the market 
economy. There is no doubt that only one institution possesses the institutional centricity so 
crucial for market coordination in the current conjuncture; there is also no doubt only one 
institution possesses the power to introduce, in Polanyi’s parlance, “protective legislation, 
restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention” to protect the Chinese society 
from the concomitant problems of market-like governance (cf. ibid.). This institution is the 
CPC. 
In the following discussion, this paper argues that state-driven redistribution is not a 
zero-sum approach (i.e. more state involvement = contracting markets); rather, the 
reshaping of Chongqing’s socio-spatial structure overlaps the reconfiguration of the city-
region’s industrial structure. The socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing are of theoretical 
significance in this aspect: while Chinese state power is commonly perceived to be 
increasingly captured by capitalists (of which paradoxically include factions in control of 
state-owned enterprises), these reforms illuminate the state’s role as a social leader whose 
overall goal is to produce “Common Affluence” without precluding the production of new 
industrial spaces. What the reforms in Chongqing exemplify, then, is a dialectical attempt by 
the central government to keep highly contingent capital investments within the Chinese 
market economy while also fulfill Deng’s 1988 commitment to spatial egalitarianism. 
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3. Chongqing as the “big platform” of experimental reforms 
 
Chongqing is one of the four8 province-level cities (zhixiashi) in China. Originally part 
of Sichuan province, the core urban area of Chongqing and three surrounding districts were 
rescaled into a city-region and directly governed by the central government on 18 June 
1997. Interestingly, Chongqing was previously a zhixiashi: during World War II and the 
Chinese civil war (1945-1949), Chongqing was the temporary capital of the Republic of 
China9 (governed by the Nationalist party which later relocated offshore to Taiwan). While 
the CPC removed Chongqing’s province-level status after it became the official government 
of China, the city’s location – more specifically, its relative isolation in China’s southwestern 
interior – was prized for geopolitical reasons. Shielded by several mountain chains and far 
from potential naval landings by foreign armed forces, Chongqing became central to Mao 
Zedong’s ‘Third Front’ defensive strategy (sanxian jianshe)10. Many industrial and military 
complexes were consequently relocated to or constructed in the city-region. 
Socioeconomic development in Chongqing would continue to evolve concomitantly 
with China’s state spatial strategies in the post-Mao era. After Deng Xiaoping implemented 
economic reforms in 1978, the ‘ladder step’ geographical theory (tidu lilun) became the 
basis of socioeconomic reconfiguration. This approach fundamentally inverted Mao’s ‘three 
Fronts’ policy: like Mao’s government, the Deng administration delineated Chinese state 
spatiality into three economic belts, namely eastern (coastal), central, and western.  
However, Deng overturned Mao’s preference to develop China’s interior hinterland by giving 
the eastern seaboard absolute priority in ascending the economic ‘ladder’. He assumed that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The other three province-level cities are along the coast, namely, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. 
These cities are centrally-governed because they are deemed highly strategic to national political-
economic development.  
9 As an entity, the ‘Republic of China’ is no longer recognized by the United Nations. It continues to 
exist in name, however, with its base in Taiwan island, and continues to be recognized internationally 
by a handful of countries. For a full geo-historical discussion, see Lim (2012). 
10 In view of potential geopolitical threats, Mao Zedong’s government decided in 1964 to designate 
China’s coastal belt as a ‘first front’ of defense, and the southwestern interior as the ‘third front’. All 
areas in between are categorized as the ‘second front’.  
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the economic fruits of development in the ‘first mover’ belt would diffuse systematically 
downwards to other rungs of the ladder, and as aforementioned, issued an injunction11 that 
interior provinces must patiently await the reciprocal assistance from (coastal) provinces 
that first attained economic growth (ref. section 2). 
The ‘ladder-step’ logic was first expressed in 1980 through the formation of four 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China’s southeastern region12. Until 1994, selected 
coastal provinces also benefited from preferential fiscal redistribution to accelerate their 
respective developments. For more than two decades, then, Chongqing’s economic growth 
– like many cities and provinces in China’s western interior – lagged behind provinces along 
the coast. National income inequality worsened correspondingly. As one academic/planner 
from Sichuan province puts it: 
Be it value-added production based on imported raw materials, or simple trade, the eastern 
region was first to connect with the world. As such, the broad western region could only 
provide supply-side impulses to the east, supplying natural gas, minerals, of course, 
incessantly supplying labor power…Against this background, the western region became a 
base of raw materials and labor power, but because of no good redistributive structure, the 
ultimate outcome is faster development in the eastern region and slower development in the 
west. It is clear that the ladder step theory did not work. (Interview, March 2012, Chongqing; 
author’s translation). 
 
It was only in the mid-1990s, after the Three Gorges Dam national energy project 
was launched, that Chongqing (re)emerged as a strategically significant city. Because of the 
sheer size and scale of the dam construction, many settlements in the upstream valleys of 
the Yangtze River had to be flooded. An estimated two-thirds of the 8 million affected 
residents were originally located in Sichuan province, the majority of them living in poverty. 
This engendered a colossal logistical and governance issue: the Sichuan provincial 
government, which already had a huge and relatively poor population under its charge, was 
confronted with the challenge of resettling and then re-employing the affected residents 
without further straining its administrative and fiscal resources.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This injunction was made during Deng’s 1988 speech titled “Two Major Situations” (liangge dajü).  
12 These four SEZs are located in the cities Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.  
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At that conjuncture, there were proposals to create a new province in the Three 
Gorges region13. It soon became apparent, however, that the central government was keen 
to avoid the costly administrative duplication and politics associated with establishing a new 
province. The primary policy concern, as the former Premier Li Peng put it in a 1986 diary 
account, was to prioritize the dam-building project over the redrawing of provincial 
boundaries (Li 2003). Since Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, was too far away 
from the flooded areas, Chongqing was identified as a more logical ‘scalar fix’ for the 
population resettlement issue. To ease the financial impact on the Sichuan government, the 
central government agreed to administer the districts of Fuling, Wanxian and Qianjiang, 
then amongst the poorest areas in Sichuan, as resettlement areas. These districts were 
then merged with Chongqing’s core urban zone to form the sprawling Chongqing 
Municipality. Through this territorial rescaling, it is intriguing to see in the Chongqing 
experience yet another geo-historical twist of fate: demoted by Mao, the city-region’s 
strategic location emplaced it as a zhixiashi for the second time in its history.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Given the politico-economic (and, by extension, ideological) significance of forming 
the first province-level city in China’s poorer western interior, the central government began 
to use Chongqing to spearhead the cross-provincial Great Western Development (xibu 
dakaifa) program. Following the redistribution of the power to ‘move first, experiment first’ 
(xianxing xianshi quan) in a gamut of policy portfolios since 2007, massive changes took 
place. Working on the basis of the Chinese central government’s ‘314’ developmental 
strategy for Chongqing in 2007, then newly-appointed Party Secretary, Bo Xilai, and mayor 
Huang Qifan proposed to the central government a list of policy advances, one of which was 
to produce the country’s third ‘nationally strategic’ economic development zone called the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In March 1985, the Chinese State Council mooted a plan to rescale a ‘Three Gorges Province’ 
(sanxia sheng). This plan would encompass the current Chongqing administrative area as well as 
western Hubei province. However, for reasons still unknown, the plan was officially cancelled in May 
1986.  
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Liangjiang New Area (the other two then were Pudong in Shanghai and Binhai in Tianjin). 
This proposal, which would give the Chongqing government greater flexibility in both land 
use planning and policy design, was complemented by an integrated strategy to effect 
localized supply-chain integration; to attract targeted transnational corporations (TNCs) to 
relocate their offshore operations to Chongqing; and to connect Chongqing to Amsterdam in 
the European Union (EU) through a borderless rail link, an unprecedented move that 
effectively cuts transcontinental transport time to 13 days (Dushikuaibao, 7 March 2011).At 
the same time, large-scale  socioeconomic reforms were launched (for a timeline of 
developments, see Table 1).  
On the social front, the Chongqing government believed the city-region’s social 
safety net needed to be fortified simultaneously. As the then-Party Secretary Bo Xilai puts it, 
“amongst our country’s four province-level cities, Chongqing’s rural area and population are 
higher than those of Beijing and Tianjin combined, if we do not do a good job at urban-rural 
integration, the core city area [of Chongqing] may advance significantly, but the areas to the 
south and north would stagnate, urban-rural disparity would then be widened…Chongqing 
must become a big platform for [policy] experiments” (Economy&Nation Weekly 10 January 
2011; author’s translation). To Yang Qingyu, Head of Chongqing’s Development and 
Reform Commission, the reform objectives in Chongqing reflect a nascent but necessary 
shift in the philosophy of national-level socioeconomic reforms:  
Crossing the river by feeling the stones is done in areas of shallow water, after reaching 
today’s deep water areas, the river can’t be crossed by feeling the stones, [we] will get 
drowned, there’s a need to form a bridge, but bridge formation requires integrated 
techniques. Hence back then [i.e. the nascent years of reforms] it’s possible for a lone soldier 
to make a breakthrough [across the river], but this cannot be done today. Yet everybody also 
cannot move forward together, this is the complicated nature of [contemporary] reforms. 
(Interview with China Business Times, 8 March 2012; author’s translation) 
 
This two-pronged developmental approach led to a surge in both GDP and fixed 
capital formation (see Figure 1). Until the appointment of Bo Xilai as Party Secretary in late 
2007, the annual GDP expansion rate ranged between 8% to 12%. This rate quickly moved 
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beyond 20% within three years. Chongqing’s GDP for 2010 registered a 21.4% expansion in 
2010; its 26.3% growth in 2011 topped China’s provincial-level GDP growth charts 
(Chongqing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Perhaps more intriguing is the scale of its 
fixed capital formation, which surged from 56% of GDP in 2007 to 88% of GDP in 2011, 
almost double the (already-high) national average.  
Figure 1 about here 
Viewed in relation to Bo and Yang’s comments, the implication of this colossal 
increase in fixed capital formation is clear: the state apparatus, rather than self-regulating 
markets, must proactively ensure the urbanization process allows everyone to 
systematically “cross the river”. This belief arguably differentiates the reforms in Chongqing 
from those of/in other provinces. What the Chongqing government purports to mitigate are 
the social costs and spatial consequences associated with urban-based industrialization. 
Indeed, the tense relations between urbanization, land use changes and wealth 
redistribution already reverberate across China (see Wu 2008; Lin 2009; Tsing 2010). One 
particular social tension, according to Youqin Huang, a prominent analyst of developments 
in China’s national housing policies, is triggered by the massive inflation in property prices in 
the decade that followed the commodification of housing provision across China14: 
[H]ousing prices have skyrocketed in cities, with the national average housing price 
increasing by 250% in the decade between 2000 and 2010. The housing price-income ratio 
classifies much of China as “severely unaffordable” in terms of housing. In big cities like 
Beijing and Shanghai, a modest apartment can cost multiple millions of yuan to purchase, 
and thousands of yuan to rent, making housing affordability the top concern of most low- and 
middle- income households. As a result, millions of migrants have been completely left out of 
the “Chinese dream,” with few owning homes in cities and most living in extremely crowded, 
poor quality dwellings. (In The Diplomat, n.p. 14 May 2013) 
 
Of particular significance, Huang adds, is the connection between housing unaffordability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 After Deng launched China’s economic reforms, housing officially became a commodity in China in 
1988. Since 1998, state-owned work units were prohibited from directly providing housing for 
workers, which expanded private housing markets. (For more elaborate discussion, see Zhou and 
Logan, 2002; Huang, 2004). Together with the effect of surplus capital looking for new investment 
outlets, prices for privately-supplied housing have experienced an upward surge since the mid-2000s. 
This consequently produced what the New York Times (14 April 2011) called “China’s scary housing 
bubble”. 
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and one’s hukou status, which in turn accentuates the tension between housing 
commodification, a post-Mao development, and the hukou institution, an enduring product of 
the ‘socialist high tide’ of 1958: 
Migrants are generally more vulnerable in the housing market due to their lower incomes and 
the discriminatory Household Registration System, or hukou system (often called an internal 
passport system), under which migrants are not considered “legal” residents in cities despite 
living and working in there over the long-term. Without local urban hukou, migrants are not 
entitled to welfare benefits such as subsidized housing. Even in Shenzhen, the city of 
migrants, local hukou is required to access low-income housing. In others cities like Beijing, 
several years of local hukou is required before applying for low-income housing. (Ibid.) 
 
Because residents holding urban hukou almost always enjoy better social benefits 
than those holding rural hukou, rural residents often find themselves disenfranchised and 
discriminated against when they relocate to cities. While the abolishment of this 
institutionalized inequality is regularly touted, its structure remains intact and is seemingly 
intractable (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). In Chan’s (1994) evocative terms, these 
migrants continue to live in “cities with invisible walls”. These seemingly intractable issues 
pertaining to the provision of low-income housing in the city to non-urban hukou residents 
would be addressed – or “magnified”, to re-borrow Qiu Feng’s terms (ref. section 1) – in 
Chongqing. As the next section will explain, the Chongqing government undertook an 
extensive construction of public rental housing – at a highly ambitious 40 million m2 between 
2010 and 2012 – to accommodate the anticipated rural-to-urban migration following the 
implementation of a flexible hukou conversion scheme (targeted at offering 10 million rural 
residents of Chongqing equal access to the social benefits enjoyed by current urban 
residents; ref. Figure 1). Of particular significance is the integral role of these socioeconomic 
policies in the (re)industrialization of Chongqing. The interplay of redistribution, reciprocity 
and market exchange in and through Chongqing thus offers an intriguing window to explore 
the possible forms of China’s ‘socialist market economy’ and, more broadly, those of 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. 
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4. Spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing as a social ‘counter movement’ 
 
4.1 Socializing capital accumulation through urban-rural integration  
 
Against the aforementioned backdrop of escalating housing prices across China, 
Chongqing’s then-Party Secretary Bo Xilai made a sudden announcement in December 
2009: in the coming decade, his government would launch a series of large-scale public 
rental housing projects to provide affordable housing to low-to-middle income Chongqing 
residents (estimated to be 30% to 40% of the total population). If unease was the initial 
reaction for (nominally-)private developers 15 , surprise would probably be next: the 
construction of the symbolically-named Minxin Jiayuan (Good Home of People’s Hearts) – 
the first project of public rental flats – began at the end of February 2010. The timing of Bo’s 
announcement – which targeted housing a third16 of the population in Chongqing’s urban 
center – appeared highly strategic in retrospect: it dovetailed with the Chinese State 
Council’s January 2010 injunction to tackle the aforementioned nationwide housing price 
inflation.  
The reason why the public rental housing projects generated strong oppositional 
response was arguably because of the scale of state involvement. According to one 
Chinese analyst, “the very reason why Chongqing’s public rental flat construction stands out 
in China is not because it is new or unique, but because of its scale. Bo [Xilai] was very 
ambitious, and his policy had the effect of signifying [property] market capture by the state 
at the expense of individuals [guojin mintui]. It seemed like a step back to the old days, and 
this made [private] firms uneasy.” (Interview, March 2012). Another scholar participant in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Most real estate developers, while incorporated, are either state-owned or joint ventures involving 
state partners (of different levels of the administrative hierarchy). For this reason, they are “nominally” 
private, but are in reality entities related to the Chinese state apparatus. Because this state-economy 
overlap produces different economic groups, all with separate profit-seeking interests, it is often said 
that reforms in China has to negotiate a labyrinth of “vested interest groups” (liyi jituan).  
16 Comparatively, National Bureau of Statistics of China data puts public rental housing at an 
estimated 7% of the national urban housing stock in 2007 (see Man 2011). Assessed vis-à-vis 
growing urbanization and housing price inflation, it is clear that following nationwide housing reforms, 
there has been a marked shift towards the private provision of residential housing.  
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policy forum in Chongqing said: “Some people liken the Chongqing reforms to the Great 
Leap Forward (GLF) – everything is about da ban [‘do it big’, a key slogan of the GLF era], 
this is because of the upfront approach of the Chongqing government about its intervention. 
In reality it’s not so strange, actually many SOEs are involved in da ban on a daily basis!” 
On the other hand, as Wen Tiejun, a prominent China-based economist, observes, the 
large-scale, state-driven approach to socioeconomic development in Chongqing cannot be 
taken as an anti-market measure. Rather, this approach is the sine qua non of 
industrialization in Chongqing, a process that would not otherwise be automatically taken up 
by the private sector:  
The advantage in Chongqing is the ability to concentrate energies and launch huge projects 
(jizhong liliang gan dashi)…Because the developmental capital in Chongqing is too high, 
most ordinary private firms would ineffective on this front; moreover, because the 
developmental parameters are to a large extent outcomes of the discussions between the 
Chongqing government and the central government, Chongqing received 12 beneficial 
policies. As such, the developmental capital could only be taken on by sizeable state-owned 
enterprises” (Wen, 2011: 65; author’s translation). 
 
Building on these observations, this paper argues that the objectives of large-scale 
socioeconomic reforms and the ways they are financed must be understood in relation to 
the Chongqing government’s simultaneous goal to expand market-like governance (ref. 
section 2). To begin with, the provision of rental housing is not simply a redistributive 
process; although the project is publicly-owned and administered, it produces and functions 
through a market – a rental market. In other words, while the government functions as a 
commodity producer that does not commit to the extraction of supernormal profits from its 
customers, it nevertheless is still a producer that extracts rent through commodity 
exchange. By unilaterally establishing the exchange-value of rental apartments, the 
Chongqing government aims to undercut what private producers are otherwise expected to 
charge. Property speculation is further precluded through the prohibition of a secondary 
resale market for rental flats (cf. Table 3 in section 4.2).  
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Viewed as an integrated developmental approach, these reforms strongly reflect an 
attempt to reduce discontent from the city’s lower-income residents and engender positive 
reciprocity from potential migrants (from Chongqing’s rural districts as well as other 
provinces) who might otherwise decide against moving into or near the Chongqing core 
urban area where major industrial zones (particularly Liangjiang New Area, the flagship 
industrialization project of the Chongqing government) are located. Clearly, then, social 
stability is a crucial ingredient for the fulfillment of nationally-mandated industrialization 
objectives in and through the city-region. As Chongqing’s mayor Huang Qifan explains: 
The large scale construction of public rental housing not only guarantees weaker groups the 
ability to lead life with dignity, it will also improve Chongqing’s investment environment and 
stimulate the local economy. Through reducing the cost of living, [affordable housing] can 
attract talents and firms and infuse life into Chongqing’s economic development, this is way 
more meaningful than land-based financing [tudicaizheng] through high property prices. 
(Interview with CCTV; transcribed by Chongqing Wanbao, 5 September 2010; author’s 
translation).  
 
Because of the separation between the government and [private] firms, the government and 
society take over [responsibility for] the workers’ lives, firms need only build factories, they 
need not build dormitories, hence their investments are reduced, this is beneficial for 
attracting investors and capital. (Interview with China Reform, November 2010; author’s 
translation) 
 
In addition, Huang and Tang Zongwei, the deputy director of the Liangjiang New 
Area Administrative Committee, elaborate how the large-scale state investments in public 
rental housing cannot be defined narrowly as process to reduce social discontent. Rather, 
these investments are integral to the national strategy to establish Chongqing – and 
Liangjiang New Area in particular – as the economic fulcrum (jingji shuniu) of interior China:  
The entry of rural workers into the city cannot lead to new poverty enclaves, nor can they be 
allowed to buy houses, they can’t afford it. Since there are several million people waiting to 
enter the city [i.e. Chongqing], we must find a way to solve their housing needs…so long as 
you are a worker in Chongqing, so long as you have worked for three, five years, the city 
needs you to work, then you can apply for rental housing. For new university graduates who 
enter Chongqing, so long as a firm employs you, then you can apply for rental housing. In 
sum, our housing safeguard system runs on the basis of urban-rural integration. (Huang 
Qifan, interview with www.news.cn, 8 March 2012; author’s translation)17   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 While the post-2007 per capita gross income in Chongqing have risen significantly, the disposable 
income of rural residents remained relatively low at ~5278 yuan per capita in 2010. Per capita 
disposable income for residents with urban hukou was ~17532 yuan (Chongqing Shangbao, 28 
January 2012). Comparatively, per capita disposable income for Shanghai’s urban residents was 
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Just within Liangjiang New Area we aim to construct around 8.5 million m2, this does not 
include the public rental housing planned elsewhere in Chongqing municipality…The 
meaning of our public rental housing project is distinct from conventional notions, our project 
is to assist those who are just about to commence employment or become entrepreneurs. 
These groups of people come from everywhere, they either do not have housing or 
temporarily cannot afford housing, if you don’t assist, they can’t settle down. Hence our public 
rental housing is targeted at a million university graduates, researchers and high-quality 
industrial workers, it is to help them enter Liangjiang, to help them integrate in this city, and it 
simultaneously resolves the problem of industrial support. (Tang Zongwei, interview with 21st 
Century Herald, 27 November 2013; author’s translation) 
 
Within the broader reform package, the rental housing project’s socioeconomic 
objective complements another urban-rural integration policy, namely the flexible conversion 
of rural migrant workers’ hukou into ‘urban’ status (see Table 2). As Youqin Huang’s 
comments in section 3 indicates, most migrant workers nationwide could not qualify for 
subsidized public housing in cities across China. The reform of hukou institutions in 
Chongqing is a spatially-targeted attempt to unhinge this enduring Mao-era legacy. Central 
to this attempt, as the Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan was at pains to point out, is a 
recognition of peasant migrants’ inherent right to be treated equally as full Chinese citizens, 
not just as economic units of labor power: 
Assuming a city has 3 million registered residents and 7 million peasant workers, after a few 
decades, when the city does not need these rural workers, they are dismissed back home, 
pushing the population down to only the [original] 3 million registered residents, then this 
urbanization process is unhealthy, abnormal, it violates international conventions, it violates 
market principles, it violates the principles of fairness and justice. (Mayor Huang, interview 
with China Economy and Informatization, 18 January 2012; author’s translation).  
Improving the treatment of peasant migrant workers is a matter of human rights, it is a 
problem of citizen rights. To treat peasant migrant workers benevolently is a matter of our 
conscience, it is a matter of governors’ consciences…Over the past few years Chongqing 
arranged for 3.6 million peasant workers to convert their hukou. The crux of our program is to 
facilitate peasant workers to enter the city, not to have more peasants in the city. With the 
development of urban-based industries, many new industrial and service sector positions 
have become available, they need to be filled by a large number of peasant workers. In the 
several years where these workers help fill the open job positions, it would be unreasonable if 
you do not provide them with urban hukous, it would be unjust, this would be half-baked 
urbanization, not a true urbanization. (Interview with China Economic Weekly, 18 March 
2013; author’s translation) 
Table 2 around here 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31838 yuan in 2010, while rural residents earned 13746 yuan per capita (www.eastday.com, 25 
January 2011). 	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To mayor Huang, the impossibility of launching instant reforms is precisely why the 
hukou institutional reforms must be implemented in stages. After all, socio-spatial 
transformation – which is akin to forming a bridge for a large party to cross a wide and deep 
river – requires time: 
The urbanization process cannot envisage a situation where, after two groups of people were 
kept apart for thirty or forty years, several hundred millions of rural workers are accumulated 
in cities and then suddenly it is announced their hukou will be changed. This [hukou 
conversion] should not be a sudden occurrence, it should begin now, it should be a natural 
and continuous transformation process. (Interview with China Economy and Informatization, 
18 January 2012; author’s translation). 
Huang’s emphases on “fairness”, “justice” and “citizen rights” in Chongqing is clearly 
an attempt to broaden the entitlements of what Smart and Lin (2007) terms “local 
citizenship”. For Smart and Lin (2007: 286), “local citizenship” is an extension of local 
governmental commitment and redistribution; it is a recognition “of the way in which China’s 
distinctive system of household registration combines with the collectivist/exclusivist 
elements of the key social institutions of the danwei (enterprise) and the village to produce a 
system in which entitlements of citizenship are determined locally”. There is a nuance in the 
re-determination of local citizenship in Chongqing, however. While the large-scale hukou 
conversion of peasants into ‘non-agricultural’ citizens and, concomitantly, the provision of 
social services to accommodate their relocation to urban areas are indeed “determined 
locally”, they are at once an outcome of centrally-redistributed experimental power (i.e. 
xianxing xianshi quan; ref. section 2). Indeed, it was only after China’s President Hu Jintao 
issued a ‘314’ integrated development strategy for Chongqing in 2007 that the city-region’s 
policymakers immediately went about launching policies to reduce the inherent rural-urban 
barriers (chengxiang bilei; ref. Table 1). The “local” attempt to enhance citizenship rights in 
Chongqing is thus more aptly conceptualized as a trans-local redistributive effect.  
One primary expression of this effect is the provision of public rental housing to rural 
residents expected to convert their hukou to the ‘non-agricultural’ (or, more simply, ‘urban’) 
category. Expanding housing supply to support hukou reforms (50% of rental housing stock 
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are allocated for new peasant migrants) is a redistributive counter-movement against the 
straining impacts of housing price inflation, as aforementioned a phenomenon triggered by 
the nationwide commodification of housing provision (cf. Polanyi 1944, 137; section 3). This 
counter-movement is particularly important as spiraling housing prices would most likely 
impact newly-minted urban residents who, like their predecessors in many of China’s urban-
industrial parks, are most likely to be employed in low-wage, labor intensive industries or 
service sectors in Chongqing’s urbanized industrial areas (particularly in the ‘nationally 
strategic’ Liangjiang New Area).  
To be sure, because the Chongqing government’s redistributive focus is 
circumscribed to controlling land rather than finance or labor power (two other ‘fictitious’ 
entities Polanyi regards as potentially debilitating for social cohesion), the provision of public 
rental housing will not completely preclude other counter-movements (e.g. protests against 
labor and environmental exploitation by firms, already commonplace in coastal cities). Put 
another way, the ongoing quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing is never going to be 
a total resolution of extant social ills in China. Rather, its expression is dialectical – specific 
‘freedoms’ of market exchange are negated without an abandonment of market 
mechanisms. For this reason, these reforms represent at best an attempt to negotiate an 
inherited institutional precondition of the CPC’s ongoing bid to develop a “socialist market 
society” – uneven spatial development. Assessed in terms of its national significance, the 
overarching objective of the Chongqing reforms is more accurately to perpetuate and 
proliferate market exchange without exacerbating the socio-spatial inequality that already 
exists at the national scale. Indeed, as will be elaborated shortly, these reforms were never 
meant to be a Maoist-styled, anti-market counter-revolution. 
 
 
4.2 The (market) value of the Chongqing ‘counter movement’ 
 
As the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing gradually became reality, oppositional 
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voices grew concomitantly. Specifically, the Chongqing reforms triggered a nationwide 
debate on ‘making a bigger cake’ (zuoda dangao, or growing the accumulated capital) in 
relation to ‘sharing the cake well’ (fenhao dangao, or redistributing existing gains). This 
debate illustrates a seemingly incommensurable conception of socio-spatial justice: to 
some, redistributing resources to enhance socio-spatial justice was the antithesis of 
expanded capital accumulation, while others viewed the enhanced stability accruing from 
redistribution as the precondition of expanded accumulation. In reality, however, the 
approach to local governance over the past three decades suggests clearly that ‘cake 
sharing’ is less important than ‘cake making’. “To compete for foreign investment”, Wu 
(2009: 842) observes, “local states [in China] maintain a stable social order and invest 
heavily in productive infrastructure such as roads and airports, while being reluctant to roll 
out welfare services.” Where and when redistributive policies are implemented, they tend to 
take on a distinct bias towards economic production, which in turn raises the question of 
what areas are considered strategic to GDP-growth and are hence deemed worthy of fiscal 
support (Oi, 1992). It was arguably for this reason that the huge costs of public rental 
housing construction and hukou conversion in Chongqing became the primary focal point of 
prominent critics. How, indeed, could a social counter movement contribute simultaneously 
to growing the cake of capital? 
Speaking to Investor Journal, Mao Yushi, the Chairman of the Unirule Institute of 
Economics in China and winner of the Cato Institute’s 2012 Milton Friedman Prize for 
Advancing Liberty, believes the Chongqing government is overextending its finances 
through debt-financing in order to generate political populism:  
The construction of rental flats is an attempt by the government to curry favor with the 
people, but where is the government’s money from? From taxpayers. […] Without the 
creation of wealth, there is no wealth to redistribute, is Chongqing more efficient than other 
places in wealth creation? The strong development of state-owned enterprises in 
Chongqing…is a way to decrease efficiency in productivity. Under such a situation, where do 
you find so much money to do good things for people’s lives? It’s very possible that [the 
policies] depend on bank credit.  (Interview with Investor Journal, 26 March 2012; author’s 
translation) 
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Wu Jinglian, a highly-influential economist and a senior economic advisor to China’s 
State Council, echoes Mao’s views: 
Such populism means sparing no expense to please the population, but it caused many 
problems for Chongqing’s budget. One cannot invest such huge resources while having little 
regard for where such resources come from. One also has to consider whether such 
investments produce returns." (South China Morning Post, 26 March 2012) 	  
The theoretical assumptions of these comments exemplify what Polanyi has 
observed to be a movement towards the establishment of a “self-regulatory market”. As Wu 
Jinglian has argued elsewhere, only two possible developmental trajectories exist for the 
Chinese economy in the current conjuncture: one involves the “perfection” (wanshan) of 
market reforms, with political power circumscribed by the rule of law, the other a “cul-de-
sac” (qiongtu) characterized by state capitalism and crony capitalism (China Entrepreneur, 
10 September 2013). For Mao Yushi, the market is quite simply “the most successful 
institution” in the course of human history (Interview with Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 4 
June 2012). Placed in relation to concrete empirical facts in China, however, this market 
fundamentalism is shaky in two ways.  
First, the argument that the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing were untenable 
just because they reflect populist politics needs unpacking. In concrete terms, the pressing 
needs for alleviating what was (and remains) a growing rich-poor divide in China’s largest 
municipality – which in itself is an outcome of the coastal- and urban-bias in earlier 
developmental strategies – would have been sufficient to merit state (pre-emptive and 
ameliorative) action (cf. section 3). Interestingly, Wu Jinglian showed he has never forgotten 
class struggle with an observation that “socioeconomic contradictions [in China] have 
already reached a critical point, we cannot continue to blunder, a revolution would happen if 
we continue to blunder” (China Entrepreneur, 1 November 2013). Mao Yushi has similarly 
acknowledged that “the biggest drawback of markets is the creation of rich-poor inequality. 
Markets create this problem, hence it cannot be resolved by markets. Its correction has to 
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come from extra-market forces.” (Interview with Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 4 June 
2012). Such is the serious nature of social problems in contemporary China, Mao Yushi 
went on to illustrate at book-length the colossal worries of the national populace since the 
1978 ‘liberalization’ reforms (see Mao, 2013). These observations raise an intriguing 
question for the conceptualization of “politically popular” socioeconomic reforms in 
Chongqing: if the need to ease social tensions is so pressing; if the people are already 
intensely worried by the reforms brought about by deepening market-like rule; and if market 
mechanisms cannot ease these tensions, would programs to ameliorate these tensions 
constitute a ‘blunder’ on the part of the CPC? China-based scholar Qiu Feng offers an 
interesting counterpoint on the interconnections between political populism (mincui zhuyi), 
“crony capitalism”, and the Chongqing reforms: 
I very much dislike those who criticize [on the basis of] populism. We can see on Weibo 
[China’s version of Twitter] people from Chongqing’s political circles who claim China’s 
biggest danger in future is populism. I wrote a commentary on this: what lies before our eyes 
is crony capitalism (quangui zibenzhuyi), what we now need to consider is how to solve this 
problem. Populism is a reaction to crony capitalism, there is first crony capitalism before 
there is populism. Now many intellectuals follow the wave to oppose populism, they equate 
the ‘Chongqing model’ to populism. I feel there should not be such a definition, resolving 
problems associated with people’s livelihoods are separate from populism.   
 
The second problematic assumption is associated with the approach to resolve 
problems associated with people’s livelihoods, namely the involvement of credit markets in 
the redistributive process in Chongqing. At one level, this concern about potential budgetary 
delinquency is warranted: many local governments in China have indeed encountered 
difficulties repaying debt to (nominally-)private creditors. It could indeed be argued that lax 
regulation and monitoring of lending practices to government-linked institutions is an 
ingredient that feeds crony capitalism. This situation is well summed up by Larry Lang, a 
prominent Hong Kong-based analyst of Chinese economic development: 
Honestly speaking, I am really worried about the local governmental debts in China. In 2009, 
local governments could still borrow from new sources to repay old creditors; by the end of 
2012, what they did was blatantly request extensions of repayment deadlines. And does 
everyone know, between 2012 and 2014 about 35% of the financial loans will mature? I do 
not dare to imagine what measures our local governments and banking system will adopt to 
address wave after wave of maturing debts. (Lang, 19 December 2013: n.p.) 
	   28	  
 
It should be clear, however, that the cause for worry is not about whether state 
agencies should borrow from credit markets at all. In this regard, Mao Yushi’s point that the 
debt-independent ability to create wealth (presumably a task exclusive to private firms) 
should undergird fiscal redistribution becomes a paradoxical assumption: in a capitalistic 
system, wealth creation is driven by debt. Mao Yushi ostensibly assumes that only private 
firms – rather than state-owned enterprises – should undertake debt because of their 
presupposed “efficiency” at wealth creation, while the redistributive process (which, in 
China, includes financing state-owned enterprises) should not imbricate wealth creation 
processes (which theoretically means any activity that qualifies for debt-financing). The 
public scholar Qiu Feng offers a different interpretation on the debt-financing issue: 
Of course, many people criticize these explorations in Chongqing, they claim that the 
Chongqing government has undertaken a lot of debt from banks, that its finances is already 
bankrupt. To be honest, this kind of argument is strange because almost all local 
governments are shouldering heavy debts, most local governments debt-finance their 
‘projects for face-creation’ (mianzi gongcheng) or ‘projects for political results’ (zhengji 
gongcheng). To just criticize Chongqing based on this point seems unreasonable. What can 
be investigated is how much has been done [in Chongqing] to improve people’s lives. (In 
China Review, 2013) 
 
In an interesting parallel with Polanyi’s (2001[1944]: 55) observation that “individual 
motives” determine the nature of redistribution, Qiu Feng calls attention to the objectives of 
redistributive policies in Chongqing. The redistributive process, for Qiu, cannot be assumed 
to be negative ab initio; it is important to evaluate whether redistributive policies can 
enhance socioeconomic development. This paper concurs with Qiu’s contention. As section 
4.1 has shown, the housing project is entwined with the hukou conversion and 
industrialization drives. If the Chongqing government had chosen not to “invest” – the term 
Wu Jinglian uses to describe fiscal redistribution – in the expansion of housing stock (rental 
or ownership-based), the investment risk would first be borne by real estate corporations, 
before being ultimately transposed onto individual buyers through a quasi-cornering process 
(current low-income urban residents and new migrants need somewhere to stay after all, 
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which translates into definite demand for housing). Yet the Chongqing policymakers 
determined the lower income strata of Chongqing’s urban migrants would find privately-
supplied apartments unaffordable (see section 4.1). This meant the lower income strata 
could not generate effective demand for privately-supplied housing unless high-risk credit 
provisions were given.  
Viewed this way, the Chongqing government’s involvement as a housing stock 
supplier is a means to reduce social risks of housing debt defaults by lower income earners 
à la the US sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008. Specifically, it illuminates the negative 
relationship between excessive housing debt and the suppression of effective consumer 
demand. As it has become clear in many cities within China and even across East Asia, 
when housing supply is controlled by private property groups (usually an oligopoly), many 
individuals would take up – and be locked-in by – housing debts that extend very long terms 
(30 to 35-year repayment periods are commonplace). Whether individuals – especially new 
rural migrants – in Chongqing are able to satisfy their loan obligations over two to three 
decades is moot per se (the US national sub-prime housing market crash is a case-in-
point); the more crucial question, rather, is the impact of long-term property debt servicing 
on economic expansion: when individuals have to devote significant portions of their 
disposable income to repay housing loans, their ability to purchase consumer goods 
naturally decreases.  
Given the inverse correlation between high housing debt and effective consumer 
demand, the public rental housing project in Chongqing offers a potential economic “return”, 
to use Wu’s parlance. It frees up disposable income, which raises the propensity for direct 
consumption and/or an increase in savings (and which then fuels new rounds of 
investments). This thus fulfills a key developmental objective – the expansion of domestic 
demand – of China’s 12th 5-Year Plan (2011-2015). The ‘double movement’ internal in the 
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Chongqing public rental housing project, assessed against this broader politico-economic 
context, transposes into a necessary supply-side “investment”.  
To address the critiques of these “investments” directly, it would be more pertinent, 
to assess the feasibility of the repayment channels. There were also differences on this 
point. Writing for the Financial Times (9 March 2012, Chinese edition; author’s translation), 
private investor Liu Haiying offers this interpretation of Chongqing’s recent budgetary 
position: 
From an analysis of [Chongqing’s] fiscal revenues…the GDP for 2011 was 1 trillion, and 
fiscal revenue (including extra-budgetary collection) was 290.8 billion…this constitutes 29% 
of GDP. That fiscal revenue takes up such a high proportion represents a strong extraction of 
social resources by the government. Yet such a strong extraction cannot satisfy its 
expenditure demands: in 2011 Chongqing’s fiscal expenditures hit 396.1 billion yuan, almost 
40% of GDP; the national proportion was 23%. From this calculation, the nominal fiscal deficit 
is 105.3 billion yuan, 10.5% of GDP, far above the 3% international warning levels.  
 
Speaking to South Korean media, Wu Jinglian went further by pronouncing the end of the 
‘Chongqing model’ based on a lacerating interpretation of Chongqing’s budgetary and fixed 
capital investment statistics:  
Chongqing’s GDP [for 2011] was around one trillion yuan, and fiscal revenue was around 150 
billion yuan [sic]. Yet within the last year [2011], the fixed assets investments in Chongqing 
reached 750 billion yuan, benefiting from this, Chongqing’s economic growth rate also 
reached 15% [sic], how long can this situation be sustained? The ‘Chongqing model’ has 
failed and is finished, hence recently Chongqing plunged into chaos. (Interview with Korea 
JoonGang Daily, 17 April 2012; author’s translation) 
 
However, Liu and Wu’s presumptions and empirical calculations were called into 
question when assessed against the official accounts of the Chongqing budget and the 
planned repayment channels of the public rental housing financial package. To begin, the 
notion of an international deficit warning level applies only to national economies (and even 
so, the 3% limit is a relative rather than an absolute indicator). The causality of this cross-
scalar relation was overlooked: Chongqing is administratively a subnational economy, which 
means it has a redistributive relation with what Polanyi (1977: 37) calls an “established 
centre” – i.e. the Chinese central government – that governs a larger politico-economic 
jurisdiction (ref. section 2). The fiscal revenue figures for Chongqing would therefore need to 
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account for the Chinese central government’s financial redistribution to Chongqing. Both Liu 
and Wu’s figures did not include this financing component; in addition, Wu did not consider 
extra-budgetary revenue figures, a glaring omission considering the information is publicly 
available. Because no standard rule states that fixed asset investments need to be solely 
financed through the redistribution of taxpayers’ monies, the issue concerning state-driven 
projects that involve credit is whether the projected repayment channels are feasible (more 
on this shortly). As such, while fixed capital investments in Chongqing have indeed soared 
over the past five years (ref. Figure 1), whether they offer concrete financial returns – and in 
turn vindicate the state’s redistributive “investments” – is contingent on the ability of these 
investments to drive and benefit from the accompanying series of industrialization projects.  
The inaccuracy of Liu and Wu’s interpretations is further underscored by new 
information on Chongqing’s budgetary health and debt-repayment channels (for detailed 
summary see Table 3). According to comprehensive statistics provided by an anonymous 
spokesperson from the Chongqing Finance Bureau, the city’s fiscal standing remains stable: 
Over the past ten years in our city, deficit has yet to appear in budgetary composition at the 
beginning of the year and the closing of accounts at year end…There are three sources of 
fiscal revenue for local governments: apart from direct revenue, there are carry-over funds 
from the previous year and transfer payments from the central government. Using 2011 as an 
example, [Chongqing’s] fiscal revenue was 290.88 billion yuan, add to that the central 
government’s support of 115.73 billion yuan, last year’s carry-over of 63.61 billion yuan, 
revenue of 5 billion yuan from the issuance of government bonds, less 2.15 billion yuan 
contribution to the central government, the total financial resource was 473.07 billion yuan, 
with actual expenditures of 396.17 billion yuan, there is still 76.9 billion yuan to be carried 
over to 2012. (Interview with www.cqnews.net, 24 March 2012; author’s translation) 
 
To be sure, statistics officially released by state agencies are not inherently more 
accurate or reliable (cf. Wang, 2010). What these figures offer is a benchmark from which 
assessments of subnational governments’ budgetary discipline could be made, and it is this 
benchmark that casts a shadow on Wu and Liu’s assertions. More detailed assessments of 
potential budget delinquency could be made after the Chongqing government took the extra 
step – a rare one in China’s context – of providing information on the funding and 
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repayment streams for the rental housing construction (ref. Table 3). Chongqing mayor 
Huang Qifan explains:  
Through the trust of and guarantees from the government, we raised 80 billion yuan from 
banks, insurance companies, social protection funds and other social financing units, of this 
80 billion yuan loan we have used 50 billion yuan in the last two years [2010-2011], in 
addition to the assigned land [valued at 30 billion yuan] and government-allocated funds. The 
central government already allocated 9 billion yuan, the local government allocated 10 billion 
yuan, this year [2012] the central government will allocate more than 10 billion yuan, which 
totals around 30 billion. (Interview with www.news.com.cn, 8 March 2012; author’s 
translation)  
 
Huang’s explanation offers a counterpoint to Wu Jinglian’s interpretation that the housing 
project gives “little regard” to the origins and eventual “returns” of fiscal expenditures. 
Indeed, as Huang further emphasizes, the provision of public rental housing operates on the 
basis of market-like exchange (cf. section 4.1): 
The rent to be collected is at least equivalent to the interest payments for bank loans. […] But 
there are still management costs and the 80 billion yuan principal sum to repay, how can this 
be balanced? No problem, because a third of the tenants in rental housing may want to buy 
over the title of the flats after 3 or 5 years, when they do so, at a capital cost of around 3000 
yuan per m2, it is possible to repay 40 to 50 billion yuan with sales of more than 10 million m2. 
In addition, 4 million m2 of the 40 million m2 will be sold for commercial use…[it] will generate 
40 billion yuan, so this debt can be balanced out. (Ibid.) 
 
Table 3 around here 
Of particular significance in the repayment plan is the function of land as at once a 
‘fictitious commodity’ and a social good. As section 2 has explained, redistribution can scale 
back the ‘freedom’ in markets. In the instance of housing provision for the lower income 
populace, land valued at 30 billion yuan was stripped of its “fictitious” façade (i.e. exchange 
value = 0 yuan). This redistributive process illustrates the path-dependence of development 
in China. The ability to determine what land is to be ‘fictionalized’ as a commodity exists 
because the CPC never relinquished the Mao-era institution of land nationalization. As such, 
it is able to prioritize use value over exchange value in cases it deems to be more socially 
effective. Whether this prioritization is less economically “efficient” is a non-issue because, 
to follow Mao Yushi’s aforementioned acknowledgement, market mechanisms inherently 
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generate and are unable to overcome social disparities (cf. Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 4 
June 2012). 
Because the fiscal capacity of the Chongqing government would be smaller than 
those of the market actors combined, plans must be in place to enable the government to 
demonstrate its ability to recover the costs “invested” in the social facilities. Otherwise its 
policies would be financially irresponsible. That Huang acknowledged the importance of 
bank credit as a financing channel is unsurprising; as Qiu Feng has emphasized, debt-
financing is commonly used by many local governments across China. Of theoretical 
significance is Huang’s detailed delineation of how the “debt can be balanced out”. 
Specifically, the entwinement of the “balancing” process with market mechanisms is telling. 
As Table 3 shows, the rental rates are not fully subsidized by the state; rather the costs can 
only be recovered because part of the available real estate would be rented or sold at 
market-determined prices. The redistributive process of ‘de-fictionalizing’ the value of land is 
thereby contingent on the ability to perpetuate its ‘fictional’ characteristic as a commodity.  If 
anything, this illustrates a tension that is intrinsic to the CPC’s official pursuit of a “socialist 
market economy”. 
Through the analysis of the funding rationale, it is clear that the state-driven social 
counter movement in Chongqing is not about the ‘state vs. the market’ or ‘politics vs. 
economics’. It is about the interaction between the state apparatus and market 
mechanisms; it is about politics determining economics through spatial reconfiguration in 
order to enhance social development. As such, the seemingly high-cost investments to 
effect spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing cannot be taken as antithetical to deepening 
marketization – or, more precisely, to deepening state-led marketization. The very raison 
d'être of spatial egalitarianism is to facilitate the socio-spatial absorption of peasant migrant 
workers that would in turn support the incoming industries (a substantial number of which 
are state-invested). Because entwinements with market mechanisms have become de jure 
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in the regulation of social life, what will concretely define ‘development’ in China will 
inevitably involve market exchange. As the repayment plan for the Chongqing reforms 
indicate, a social counter movement in China may never be external to markets; its 
ostensibly non-market objective, expressed paradoxically in market-like ways in Chongqing, 
could be at once for markets.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
For peasant workers who enter a city today, on what basis should their children feel, 20 years 
later, that they are still rural residents rather than the local residents of that city? If historical 
evolution cannot find a connection point here, then our generation would be lamentable; it 
would be one with no foresight or sense of justice. – Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan 
(Interview with Chongqing Wanbao, 25 August 2010; author’s translation)   
 
The urban-rural dual structure is the primary obstacle restraining the integration of urban-
rural development. – Communiqué of the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Congress of the CPC 
(Xinhua, 12 November 2013) 
 
Two decades ago, the proclamation “Development is the absolute principle” (fazhan 
shi yingdaoli) by China’s then-leader Deng Xiaoping arguably triggered GDP-worship across 
the country. In the subsequent decade, ‘development’ was narrowly interpreted as the 
inexorable quest to maximize surplus value capture through the market exchange of 
commodities. The inevitable consequence was pronounced socio-spatial inequality. It was 
against this national context of economic-geographical unevenness and rising social angst 
that led Wang Shaoguang (2002 n.p.) to proclaim “social equity is also the absolute 
principle”. After Hu Jintao became China’s leader in 2003 and launched the ideology 
‘Scientific Perspective on Development’, the quest to reconcile high-speed economic 
expansion with more equitable redistribution gained momentum. As Hu would later add, 
“development is the absolute principle, [but] stability is the absolute task, without stability, 
nothing can be done, whatever we have achieved will also be lost” (www.chinanews.com, 1 
July 2011; author’s translation). In this regard, Hu’s ‘314’ injunction for experimental reforms 
in the Chongqing city-region is evidently a spatial expression of a shift in the CPC’s 
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developmental ideology (ref. Table 1). The “absolute” task of producing social stability in 
China, as the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing indicates, has to be predicated on the 
impeachment of instituted uneven development. 
This paper has presented a substantivist analysis of two interrelated socioeconomic 
reforms to actualize spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing. These reforms are, namely, the 
large-scale public rental housing provision and the equally large-scale conversion of 
peasant migrants hukous. Expanding on Polanyi’s (1957) view of the economy as “instituted” 
by redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange, the discussion explored how these three 
modes of integration intersect in Chongqing to produce the “stability” necessary for the 
national-scale expansion of (capitalistic) industrialization. This intersection in turn 
underscores the fluid and trans-local nature of the social embeddedness in China: it is 
constituted by centrally-instituted redistributive policies and inter-regional reciprocity that 
were set in motion by earlier layers of instituted uneven development (ref. sections 3 and 4). 
By extension, it disrupts the prevailing assumption in Polanyi-inspired studies that 
unproblematically takes the national scale as the primary scale of socioeconomic integration.  
That location plays an active role in determining socioeconomic change reinforces 
and refines the Polanyian conceptualization of the ‘double movement’. For Polanyi, the 
‘double movement’ represents an opposition between market mechanisms and the social 
formations within which these mechanisms are situated (ref. section 2). This ‘double 
movement’ is intrinsically a paradox because it is through oppositional forces that a 
socioeconomic formation evolves in a forward motion. Through generating strong debates 
and attention nationwide, the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing brought attention to 
issues stemming from the CPC’s own marketization drive on the back of instituted uneven 
development. Yet the decision to launch the ‘counter movement’ in a geographically-
targeted location indicates how the opposition internal to the ‘double movement’ is place-
specific: it simultaneously pushes against and is hemmed in by the broader state spatiality 
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in which it is located.  
This phenomenon in turn raises a searching question that demands elaborate 
research on its own: why did the CPC persist with the “dual structure” to the point of having 
to generate its own (spatial) contradiction? The fact that no operational budget has been 
drawn up to overcome this Mao-era legacy at the national scale – even after the official 
acknowledgement of its encumbrance at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Congress in November 
2013 – is telling: institutionalized spatial unevenness remains of constitutive value for the 
regulation of Chinese economy and society (cf. Lim, 2014). This value arguably generated 
strong opposition to the quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing. Ironically, however, 
the strong opposition reflects how vested interests have come to dominate economic 
development in China. More importantly, it illustrates the intrinsic connection of these 
interests to national socioeconomic policies instituted as far back as 1958. The reason why 
intense opposition emerged almost right from the beginning of the reforms in Chongqing is 
symptomatic of a fear that the CPC was genuinely prepared to remove the “primary 
obstacle” to urban-rural integration. Yet the emergence of this fear reflects the spatial 
potential internal to the pursuit of spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing. Its existence suggests 
that fresh developmental undercurrents are forming; that the future of Chinese economy 
and society could have a new spatial basis.  
In this respect, the socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing presented in this paper 
contradict conventional portrayals of ‘Maoist’ resurgence in the municipality. Contrary to 
Mao’s favored dialectical approach of launching an ‘affirmative’ event through the ‘negation’ 
of another separate event, the Chongqing government had effectively shown that, with 
effective redistribution, ‘affirmation’ (economic growth through marketization) need not be 
based on ‘negation’ (uneven spatial development). If anything, the social ‘counter 
movement’ instituted in and through Chongqing is a targeted form of anti-Maoism cloaked in 
the spirited melodies of the municipal government’s favorite ‘Red Songs’. As evidenced by 
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the swift growth of the Liangjiang New Area, the overarching objective of the CPC’s 
socioeconomic reforms is to emplace spatial egalitarianism as the corollary of the quest for 
a “socialist market economy”.  
This increasing importance of spatial justice on the marketization agenda indicates 
that historical evolution in China appears close to coming full circle. Between 1950 and 
1952, the CPC centralized and facilitated the egalitarian redistribution of a ‘fictitious 
commodity’ – land – for poor peasants across the newly established nation-state. Through 
the Land Reform Act known colloquially to have ‘altered the heavens and changed the 
earth’ (gaitian huandi), the entire populace experienced common affluence for the first time 
in the history of ‘new China’. Integrating the national economy on this egalitarian basis, the 
land reforms arguably constituted the first mega event launched by the CPC. As the 
contemporary Xi Jinping leadership contemplates unleashing a new wave of economic 
growth through nationwide urbanization, the quest for spatial egalitarianism in Chongqing 
suggests that, if the proposed urbanization process unfolds on the basis of social equity, the 
newest and most beautiful mega event could yet already be in the making.  
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Figure 3.1 Fixed Capital Investments and GDP in Chongqing, 1949-2012 
 
 
 
Source: Chongqing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2013); author’s graphical illustration.  
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Fixed capital 
investments 
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2007: Hu Jintao, in tandem 
with Wang Yang, launched  
'314' developmental plan  
for Chongqing; fixed capital  
investment was 57% of GDP 
 
2010: Liangjiang New Area 
established; hukou conversion 
& public rentral housing con- 
struction launched; fixed capital 
investment surged to 88% of GDP  
2012: Fixed capital investment 
dropped to 81%; future of  
hukou & housing reforms  
unclear 
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Table I A geo-historical overview of key socioeconomic developments in Chongqing 
 
 
Year 
 
Development 
 
Characteristics 
 
1997 Granted province-
level city 
(zhixiashi) status 
• First (and at the time of writing, still the only) city in China’s interior to be 
granted this status 
• Discursively identified as the ‘window’ to and ‘dragon head’ of the west 
• Entrusted by the central government to fulfill ‘4 big things’ (sijiandashi), 
namely 1) the resettlement of migrants affected by the Three Gorges Dam 
construction; 2) the reformation of old industrial bases; 3) the ‘lifting’ of the 
poor in rural villages; and 4) the protection of the biophysical environment.  
•  
2000 Official 
implementation of 
the ‘Great 
Western Opening 
Up’ (xibudakaifa) 
cross-provincial 
program 
 
• Chongqing aligned to the experimentation of ‘big city lead big village’ 
(dachengshi dai danongcun) developmental approach 
• Identified as a geographic hub that connects the central and western parts 
of China 
2007 ‘314’ Overall 
Strategy identified 
(zongtibushu) 
• Launched by China President Hu Jintao during the national ‘Two Meetings’ 
in March, in tandem with Chongqing Party Secretary Wang Yang 
• ‘3’ in ‘314’ refers to 3 major positioning, namely 1) to accelerate 
Chongqing’s position as a ‘growth pole’ (zengzhangji) in western China; 2) 
to be the economic hub of the Yangtze upstream; and 3) to develop through 
urban-rural integration (chengxiangtongchou) 
• ‘1’ in ‘314’ refers to the broad overall objective of attaining the first ‘affluent 
society’ in western China 
• ‘4’ in ‘314’ refers to ‘4 major tasks’ (sidarenwu): 1) expand ‘industrialization 
to stimulate agrarian development (yigongcunong), ‘lead the countryside 
through the city’ (yichengdaixiang) and develop a new ‘socialist countryside’; 
2) realistically transform the means of economic growth and accelerate the 
reformation of old industries; 3) address the livelihood problems of the 
people so as to develop a Harmonious Society; and 4) holistically enhance 
city-building and raise the standards of urban management 
• The strategy would form the guiding framework for subsequent 
socioeconomic reforms in the municipality 
 
2009 ‘No 3’ document 
(guofa sanhao 
wenjian) issued 
on Chongqing’s 
socioeconomic 
reforms  
• Issued January; termed ‘A number of opinions regarding the enhancement 
of Chongqing city’s urban-rural integration reforms and development’; 
marked the implementation of the ‘314’ integrated developmental strategy 
• Includes 12 policy suggestions by Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and 
Mayor Huang Qifan, and 7 additional suggestions by a State Council 
research team, forming a ‘12+7’ policy framework 
• Identifies Chongqing’s reforms as a ‘national strategy’ (guojia zhanlüe); with 
Chongqing given a ‘strategic position’ (zhanlüe diwei) 
 
2010 Designated a 
‘national central 
city’ in ‘National 
Urban System 
Plan’ (quanguo 
chengzhentixi 
guihua) 
• Plan devised by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development; 
announced in February.  
• Only city amongst the five designated cities – Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou – not located along the coast  
 
 
 
2010 Liangjiang New 
Area officially 
opened for 
development 
• Unveiled on 18 June, the same date when Chongqing became a province-
level city 
• An economic development zone spanning 1200km2, within which 
experimental policies are devised and implemented 
• Positioned as ‘one door, two centres and three bases’ (yimenhu, 
liangzhongxin, sanjidi), namely 1) the main entry point to western China; 2) 
both an import-export trading centre and a financial centre in the Yangtze 
upstream region; and 3) the bases for modern manufacturing, export-
processing and the commercialization of R&D outcomes 
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2010 Two major socio-
spatial policies 
launched 
• Public rental housing construction begins in February 
• Hukou conversion program officially implemented in (after a series of pilot 
experimentations)  
   
2013 Administrative 
autonomy mooted 
for Liangjiang 
New Area 
• On 30 November 2013, the Chongqing announced a series of decisions to 
detailing how administrative autonomy is to be granted to Liangjiang New 
Area; allows the New Area greater flexibility to respond to national and 
global economic opportunities 
• Indicates a continuity of the spatial project launched by the Bo Xilai-Huang 
Qifan administration; whether social reforms will be expanded remains 
unclear 
 
Source: Chongqing Ribao (8 October 2007; 14 January 2012); People’s Daily Online (10 February 2010). Data 
compiled and translated by author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   45	  
Table II Key characteristics of evolving hukou reforms in Chongqing 	  
 
Geo-historical context 
 
Objectives of hukou 
reforms in Chongqing 
 
 
Policy shifts 
 
• Instituted in 1958 by the Mao 
Zedong government to control 
population movement 
• Citizens broadly categorized 
as ‘urban’ and ‘rural’; hukou 
(household registration 
affiliation) determined social 
benefit provision, administered 
by provincial governments;  
• Primary aim was to control the 
right to the city by preventing 
mass rural-to-urban migration; 
hence widely viewed as a 
form of socio-spatial apartheid 
and institutionalized inequality	  
• Right of movement 
significantly relaxed since the 
1990s as industrialization 
expanded in cities, but the 
system remains relatively 
intact 	  	  
 
• To guarantee the 
interests of those who 
work in the city without 
urban residency 
• To improve rural 
productivity through 
the transference of 
spare labor to the 
urban areas 
• To improve the urban 
population structure 
and alleviate the 
pressure of an aging 
society 
• To expand domestic 
demand 
• To speed up the 
process of 
urbanization.	  
 
• Reforms officially launched on 15 August 
2010 with the introduction of “The 
Opinion on hukou Institutional Reforms 
in the Urban-rural Integration of 
Chongqing Municipality”  
• Based on a ‘voluntary, compensatory’ 
(ziyuan, youchang) principle 
• Expanded provision of social benefits for 
urban hukou holders: partially financed 
through fiscal redistribution, with firms & 
urban residents contributing the rest 
• New urban migrants will enjoy, amongst 
other social benefits, access to public 
rental housing if they meet the stipulated 
conditions 
• Switching the right to use land is not a 
precondition of hukou conversion*; the 
transference of land rights is voluntary 
and all transfers will be compensated 
 
	  
Sources: Chan and Buckingham (2008); Caijing (30 August 2010; 30 August 2010); data compiled and 
translated by author. 	  
* After this standpoint is cross-referred with the published regulations, the relationship between huji conversion and ownership 
of land use rights remains unclear: the new regulation states plainly rural residents have three years to relinquish their land if 
they choose to convert huji, which contradicts the discursive statements that huji conversion is not entwined with land rights 
transfer. The disentanglement of huji conversion with land rights transfers – which precludes the creation of a ‘third category’ of 
citizens with urban huji status and rural land use rights – therefore remains a policy ‘grey zone’. 	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Table III Emergent characteristics of Chongqing’s public rental housing provision 	  
 
Proposed volume 
 
 
Targeted residents and rental 
conditions 
 
 
Financing & repayment strategy 
• Original plan in 
announced 
February 2010 
was to build 40 
million m2 over 10 
years; but target 
is expected to be 
met as early as 
2012  
• Construction on 
13 million m2 & 
14.25 million m2 
(approximately 
219200 units) 
began in 2010 & 
2011, respectively 
• Construction on 
13.2 million m2 
(approximately 
237400 units) 
projected for 2012 
Targeted residents:  
• Homeless families or families 
whose current living space is less 
than 13m2 per person; and 
• Individuals who are employed 
within the Chongqing core urban 
area and other stipulated urban 
zones; and 
• Individuals with a monthly salary 
not above 2000 yuan; or a 2-
person family unit with a 
combined income not above 3000 
yuan; or a bigger-than-2 person 
family unit with an average 
income not above 1500 yuan 
• Rental rates established at around 
60% of market prices (2010 
levels) 
• Quota: 50% for peasant workers, 
15% for new university graduates, 
and 35% for existing urban 
residents with housing difficulties 
• Key qualifier: Individuals who 
meet the above conditions do not 
need to hold Chongqing hukou 
status 
 
Rental and ownership restrictions: 
• Tenants are allowed to purchase 
their rental units from the state at 
just above cost-price after 
residing for 5 years 
• Tenants opting not to buy can 
continue to rent so long as they 
meet the prevailing requirements 
• Tenants who purchase the units 
cannot re-sell them on the open 
property markets; units can only 
be re-sold to the state; no 
secondary market allowed for 
public flats.  
 
Operating costs: 
• Preliminary fiscal injection: 30 billion yuan 
• Opportunity cost: estimated 30 billion yuan 
in fiscal revenue, if the land used (based 
on 2010 land use planning and land 
valuation) is tendered out for leasing 
• Bank credit: first wave of loans injected by 
Huaxia Bank in September 2009; new 
loan commitments by Bank of 
Communications, ICBC and China 
Construction Bank followed; more than 10 
billion yuan injected by 2012; interest rate 
estimated to be around 5% 
• Insurance firms, Housing Provident 
Funds, Social Protection Funds etc.; more 
than 40 billion yuan raised from these 
sources in 2011 
• On 23 April 2012, Chongqing Land Group 
(owned by the municipal government) 
obtained approval to issue 5 billion yuan in 
corporate bonds for affordable housing; 
the biggest amount approved in China at 
the time for affordable housing 
construction 
 
Repayment channels: 
• Rental income used to cover loan interest 
payments; rental rate (hence income) 
subject to (upward) adjustments, in 
relation to per capita GDP growth 
• 5% of revenue collected from annual land 
leasing is committed to financing public 
rental housing construction 
• An estimated 1/3 of tenants expected to 
purchase units; sales income will be used 
to cover principal repayment 
• Of the area already completed or currently 
under construction (around 40 million m2, 
based on March 2012 calculations), 1/10 
will be rented and/or sold for commercial 
use at open market prices; all sales 
revenue will contribute towards debt 
repayment 
• Key strategy: The financialization and 
repayment process is predicated on a 
structured cost-recovery model 
 	  
Sources: Chongqing Chengbao (9 June 2010); Chongqing Ribao (28 October 2010) Nanfang Zhoumo (26 August 
2010); China Economy & Informatization (18 January 2012); www.news.cn (8 March 2012); Sina Dichan (9 April 
2012); www.cqnews.net (26 April 2012); author’s notes from participation in seminars with planners and policy 
consultants in Chongqing. Data compiled and translated by author.  	  
 
